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L I N K  TO  I N I T I A L  C O R R E S P O N D E N C E
In a recent Review (The functional role of 
the parieto-frontal mirror circuit: interpreta-
tions and misinterpretations. Nature Rev. 
Neurosci. 11, 264–274 (2010))1, Giacomo 
Rizzolatti and I were aiming to highlight the 
functional role of the parieto-frontal mirror 
network in understanding the actions and 
intentions of others. Leonhard Schilbach has 
recently argued (A second-person approach 
to other minds. Nature Rev. Neurosci. 20 
May 2010 (doi: 10.1038/nrn2805-c1))2 that, 
although “well balanced”, the Review does 
not take into account the enactive approach 
to social cognition and so overlooks the fun-
damental difference between being directly 
engaged in interaction with someone else 
(that is, having a second-person perspective) 
and merely observing others (assuming a 
third-person perspective). This putative 
fault would be particularly relevant because, 
according to Schilbach2, our understand-
ing of how the mirror and ‘mentalizing 
networks’ contribute to social cognition 
would depend on being “able to investigate 
real-time interactions between individuals in 
an ecologically valid way”2.
There is no doubt that the shift from 
sharing to coordinating and joining actions 
and intentions constitutes a crucial step in 
social cognition3,4. And it is true that social 
neuroscience needs to make use of experi-
mental paradigms that are as ecologically 
plausible as possible. Indeed, most of the 
more intriguing properties of the mirror 
mechanism could be found by assuming 
ecological paradigms5,6. However, I think it is 
misleading to characterize the mirror-based 
action and intention understanding as a 
pure third-person grasp of other individuals’ 
mental states that is performed in a mere 
observational — that is, detached — stance7, 
as it fails to appreciate the full implications 
of the discovery of the mirror system.
The functional properties of the parieto-
frontal mirror circuit indicate that our ability 
to act shapes how we make sense of others’ 
behaviour to the extent that the latter can 
be construed as a modality of the former, 
at least at the basic level8. By mapping the 
action of others onto our own motor reper-
toire, the mirror mechanism not only unifies 
action and perception, but also undermines 
the sharp distinction between the observa-
tional and the engaged stance. In this regard, 
it is crucial to avoid confusing the experi-
mental setting of most mirror experiments 
with the function of the mirror mechanism. 
It is true that mirror investigations usually 
attempted to uncouple the acting and per-
ceiving phases, because this was the only  
way in which the motor responses to the 
observation of others’ actions could be 
convincingly labelled as ‘mirror’. But this 
does not signify that a mirror-based under-
standing of others is detached or disengaged 
— that is, purely spectatorial in nature. Quite 
the opposite: what the mirror mechanism 
suggests is that our making sense of others 
can be enactive in nature even when we 
are just observing others’ actions. In other 
words, it suggests that the mere observation 
of others’ actions can be considered a limit 
case of an interaction9. For this reason, we 
characterized mirror-based action under-
standing as an understanding “from the 
inside”; that is, as an understanding  
of the observed action as one’s own motor 
possibility1.
This does not deny the relevance of 
attempts to investigate mirror responses in 
real-time social interactions. However, such 
investigation needs a preliminary clarifica-
tion both of the basic functional properties 
of the parieto-frontal mirror circuit and also 
of the relation between the mirror-based 
understanding of actions and intentions and 
the fully fledged ‘mindreading’ process. As 
far as the latter is concerned, I cannot agree 
on the notion that the difference between 
the mentalizing network and the mirror 
network and their complementary roles in 
cognition could be reduced to “a function of 
direct engagement in real-time interaction”2. 
Of course, mirroring and mentalizing can be 
modulated by interactions. However, such 
modulation could not be detected without a 
prior understanding of the different aspects 
of action description that are involved both 
in the mirror mechanism and in the mental-
izing processing. This prior understanding 
was the main aim of the Review.
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